developing countries due to low levels of regulatory capacity, pressure on the part of firms to compete in a global economy, and low levels of household income (Blackman, 2009; Anton, Deltas and Khanna, 2004) .
In this paper we argue that voluntary certification can play an important role in the revelation of information about firm costs of compliance that can, in turn, increase the efficacy of command and control regulation.
In particular, we suggest that in the presence of perfectly observable environmental behavior, there would be little point to a
program that provides some kind of public acknowledgement in the form of a "certificate". But given imperfect information, certification programs give firms a structured opportunity to signal information about their underlying cost structure. The consequent revelation of information can be of value to both regulators and to other economic agents such as financiers. In particular, if the process of certification reveals information about plants that certify, it also reveals information about those that do not. This information may be used in turn to more efficiently target inspections and thus to alter the behavior of uncertified plants. At the same time, if certification signals to financiers that a firm is in compliance and thus not subject to the risk of a failed inspection, then some firms will benefit from this signaling, thus providing an appropriate incentive for compliant firms to engage in certification in the first place. In a sense the problem of selection that has plagued much of the previous empirical literature on voluntary certification is the primary potential source of benefit of such programs.
To clarify this point we first summarize the results from Foster and Gutierrez (2012) . That plants are then exempted from inspections for a specified period of time (at least two years).
I. Environmental Regulation in Mexico

II. Selection, Revealed Information and the
Regulator's Response
Foster and Gutierrez ( In particular, the cost of compliance with pollution emissions standards without certification for plant i in sector j is:
(1) 
where α, β, and μ are constants that are common to all plants. Finally, the cost of noncompliance is given by:
where j P is the probability that the authorities will inspect a plant in sector j and M is the fine imposed if the inspected plant is found to be out of compliance. M is assumed to be fixed and exogenous and j P is set at the sector level, given that regulators are unable to observe (or are precluded, for reasons of transparency, from using) the plants' specific will not generally internalize the benefits to the regulators or certification.
[ Insert Table 1 ]
III. Certification, Information and Capital
Markets' Response
Having observed circumstantial evidence of the informational benefits of certification, it is useful to look directly for evidence that the program reveals information to other agents. In order to test if the granting of certificates is rewarded by capital markets, we thus perform a simple event study. In particular, we identify four Mexican multi-plant publicly traded firms to which we were able to assign the specific dates at which a Clean Industry Certificate was granted over the [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] period. Table 2 presents the names of the publicly traded firms and the specific dates at which these events occurred.
[ Insert Table 2] We then calculated the daily return of that firm's stock price in the Mexican stock market during the ten days before and after the date at which each certificate was granted, and ran the following regression, at the event level: Regression results are presented in Table 3 . [ Insert Table 3 
